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ADVERSE POSSESSION
By

FREDERICK

B. HELM, A.B., LL.B.*

The purpose of this article is to state the law of Wisconsin
pertaining to the acquisition of title to real property by adverse
possession. Upon this subject there is a great diversity of
opinion for the reason that it presents some of the most doubtful
questions known to the law. In most states, statutes of limitation operate to cut off one's right to bring an action for the
recovery of real property which has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time and vest title in the disseizor.
Wise public policy has dictated these legislative enactments. The
intention is not to punish one who has neglected to assert his
rights but to protect those who have maintained the possession
of land for the time specified by the particular statute, under claim
of right of color of title.'
In view of the importance of these statutes of limitation it is
fitting and proper to review the statutory law of Wisconsin upon
the subject of disseizion-adverse possession. In Wisconsin
there are two periods of limitation. Under Section (4211, 4212,
4215), Wisconsin Statutes, the adverse holder claims under color
of title and the period of limitation under such circumstances is
ten years. Under Sec. 4211, Wisconsin Statutes, the period of
limitation is twenty years when claim of title is not founded upon
any written instrument, judgment or decree of any competent
court.
Our Wisconsin legislature has enacted the Statutes which follow:
I. ADVERSE

POSSESSION,

DEFINITION, SECTION 4212

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any
person claiming a title founded upon some written instrument or
some judgment, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and
occupied in the following cases:
I. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel 'or of fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry or
for the ordinary use of the occupant.
Jasperson vs. Scharnikon, i5o Fed. 571.
*Member of Racine, Wisconsin. Bar.
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4. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left
not cleared or not inclosed, according to the usual course and
custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or
cultivated.
II. EXTENT OF POSSESSION NOT FOUNDED ON WRITTEN JUDG-

MENT, ETC., SECTION 4213
When there has been an actual continued occupation of any
premises under a claim of.title, exclusive of any other right, but
not founded upon any. written instrument or any judgment or
decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no other, shall be
deemed to be held adversely.
III. ADVERSE: PossEsoN, WHAT IS, SECTION 4214
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title, not founded upon some written instrument or
any judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
I. When it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
2. When it has been usually cultivated and improved.

IV. ACTION BARRED

BY ADVERSE POSSESSION, WHEN, SECTION

4215
An adverse possession of ten years under Sections 4211 and
4212 or of twenty years under Sections 4213 and 4214 shall constitute a bar to an action for the recovery of such real estate so
held adversely or of the possession thereof.
V.

PRESUMPTION ON ADVERSE HOT-DING UNDER CONVEYANCE OR

JUDGMENT, SECTION 4211

Where the occupant or those under whom he claims entered
into possession of any premises under claim of title, exclusive of
any other right, founding such claim upon some written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon
the judgment of some competent court, and that there has been
a continual occupation and possession of the premises included in
such instrument or judgment or of some part of such premises
under such claim for ten years, the premises so included shall be
deemed to have been held adversely; except that when the premises so included consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession
105
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of one lot shall not be deemed the possesion of any other lot of
the same tract.
WISCONSIN'S LIBERALITY OF CONSTRUCTION

As to what constitutes adverse possession in the states of the
United States there is a wide diversity of opinion. In Wisconsin
there is a great liberality of construction. The first requisite is
that the owner must be out of possession. The second requisite
is that the one who claims adverse possession must have exclusive
possession of the property. Such possession must be open and
notorious, that the world may know and see that the adverse
claimant is in possession. The holding must be continuous and
it must be with an intention of claim possession. In Wisconsin
the occupancy must be open, notorious and exclusive and the
occupancy need not be hostile nor with the intent to take the
title from the owner.
REQUISITES OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
HOSTILE INTENTION

The rule as announced in the early Wisconsin cases was as
follows: "To constitute adverse possession there must be the
fact of 'possession and hostile intention-the intention to usurp
possession; and, if there be possession of land by one not the
true owner, the presumption of law is that such possession is in
accord or comity with; and subservience to, the true title and
legal possession of the owner."'
And then our Supreme Court in the case of Meyer vs. Hope,
101 Wis. 23 said that hostile intention might be inferred in these
words: "Although adverse possession must be clearly and satisfactorily proven, yet a hostile entry at the beginning may properly be inferred from evidence of continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession for twenty years, when unexplained as to
its commencement."
This was indeed a courageous step for any court to take in
view of the fact that most of the states at that time and of to-day
announce the following general rule as the law of adverse possession.
"Adverse possession is not to be made out by inference, but by
'The cases which support this doctrine are as follows: Avers vs. Reidel,
84 Wis. 283; Dhein vs. Beusclter, 83 Wis. 316; Sclhuallback vs. C. M. &
St. Paul Ry. Co., 69 Wis. 298; Hacker vs. Horlemnus, 74 Wis. 2i; Harvey
vs. Tyler, 3 Wall 349.
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clear and positive proof. Possession must be with such circumstances as are capable in their nature of notifying to mankind
that he is upon the land claiming it as his own, in person or tenant-it must be visible, open, exclusive. It must be hostile in
its inception'and continue, notorious and not secret." 3
And in I R. C. L. 703 the general rule is stated: "It is unanimously agreed that to be adverse, the possession of the disseizor
must be hostile not only as against the true owner, but as against
the world, excepting only the Government."
But our Supreme Court dared to take a step farther and the
case of Illinois Steel Co. vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23 distinctly declared that a hostile intention was not necessary when it said:
"When the physical fact of possession has existed for the statutory period the law supplies the hostility and adversary intention, subject only to the qualification that such possession was
not in fact derivative from and subordinate to the true title."
In Wisconsin, therefore, it appears that the definition of the
word "hostile" given by the lexicographer: viz., "showing ill
will and malevolence, or a desire to thwart and injure," does not
correctly state the character of the occupancy necessary to create
adverse possession, for there need be no ill will, malevolence or
desire to injure anyone, and the element of hostility in that sense
is not necessarily involved. It means only that one in possession
of lands claims the exclusive right thereto.
ACTUAL POSSESSION

One claiming land adversely must, in order that his claim may
be effective as against the owner, be in actual possession thereof,
for without such occupancy, the law assumes the possession to be
in the owner of the legal title.' The necessity for actual possession was clearly announced by Siebecker J. in his decision of
Mumbrue vs. Larsen, i6o Wis. at 48o, when he said: "The evidence of adverse possession fails to show that the land in dispute
was in actual and visible possession and occupancy by persons who
asserted a hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession thereof to
the exclusion of the true owner."
'McClellan vs. Kellog, 17 Ill. 498; Bluner vs. Iowa R. Land Co.. 129
Ia. 32, 105 N. W. 342; Maas vs. Burdetzke, 93 Minn. -95, IO N. W. 182;
Clemens vs. Runckel, 34 Mo. 41; Smith vs. Jones, lO3 Tex. 632, 132 S. NV.
469.

'I R. C. L. 693.
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POSSESSION MUST BE EXCLUSIVE

The claimant's possession must be such as to indicate his exclusive ownership of the property.' In stating what constitutes
an adverse possession all the authorities agree that it must be
exclusive, that is, the claimant must hold possession of the land
for himself and not for another.6
Timlin J. in Illinois Steel Company vs. Taurms, in 154 Wis. at
page 343, says: "The possession must be exclusive of that of the
true owner. The adverse possession must be such as to furnish
the true owner means of knowing of such adverse claim. Ordinarily mere open possession without his consent will do so."
Citing Lampman vs. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 417, Kurz vs. Miller,

89 Wis. 426.
POSSESSION MUST BE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS

The disseizor must unfurl his flag on the land and keep it flying
so that the owner may see, if he will, that the enemy has invaded
his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.7 The words
"open and notorious possession," as applied to the adverse holding of land by another, means that the disseizor's claim must be
evidenced by such acts and conduct as are sufficient to put a man
of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact that the land in question is held by the claimant as his own.8 The disseizor must intend to hold the land for himself and that intention must be
made manifest by his acts.' A disseizin, or ouster, in fact is
defined to be the wrongful putting out of him that is actually
seized of the freehold °
POSSESSION MUST

BE CONTINUOUS

In the leading case of Illinois Steel Company vs. Budzisz in
io6 Wis. 499, Marshall J. has written an able opinion on the
necessity for continuous possession. The author quotes from
that most eminent jurist.
"Actual, hostile, exclusive occupancy of land, completely dispossessing the true owner without any presumption or claim of
'I R. C. L. 693; Lins vs. Seefeld, 126 Wis. 61o.
'I R. C. L. 701.
"I R. C. L. 693.
'I R. C. L. 7oo.
'Ibid.
"0 I R. C. L. 702.
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right will ripen into title under Sec. 4207 if continued for the
requisite period."
"Such an occupancy of land does not, before the expiration of
the period within which the owner may reclaim possession, constitute any estate or interest in the land, nor is the substitution of
another occupant to continue the dispossession of the true owner,
the transfer of any such estate or interest in the land within the
meaning of Sec. 2302."
"Successive possessions may be tacked together as to form a
continuous and uninterrupted possession for the essential period
of time. There must be a privity existing between the parties
transferring the possession."
"Such possession may begin in parol without deed or writing
and may be transferred from one occupant to another by parol
bargain and sale accompanied by delivery. All that the law requires is continuity of possession where it is actual and this
continuity and connection may be effected by any conveyance or
understanding which has for its object a transfer of the rights of
the possessor or of his possession when accompanied by an actual
deliveiy of the possession."
"Good faith by the adverse claimant as to his right at the
instant of entry, or during the limitation period, is not necessary
because the statute by its terms only requires actual, continuous.
exclusive possession under such circumstances as to wholly dispossess the true owner both actually and constructively."
"Actual, continuous, exclusive possession for the statutory
period, unexplained, displaces the presumptions in favor of the
true owner and creates a presumption of fact that such possession, and the commencement of it, were characterized by all the
requisites" of title by adverse possession and that the title of the
adverse claimant is perfect, the statute provides."
"By judicial construction, now-a rule of property, the statute
does not apply unless the exclusion of the owner from possession
has been during the whole period by a single hostile possession,
exercised either by one or more persons acting together, or by
possessions in succession connected by privity between the
actors."
"A transfer io connect successive possessions in conformity to
Sec. 2302 is not an essential to the privity necessary to continue
the mere dispossessed condition of the true owner."
"The calls of a deed, when title by adverse possession is
lo9
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claimed, limit the right as a matter of law. (a) Where the ten
year statute relating exclusively to claims of title founded in
written instruments is relied only. (b) As to the extent which
actual possession of a part will draw to it constructive possession
of the whole. (c) To extent of which title can be claimed by
adverse possession under the instrument itself."
"The calls of the deed limit the right as a presumption of fact;
where a person is in possession of lands outside of but adjacent
to and together with lands within the calls of his deed, also where
the person being so circumstanced by written instrument conveys
the lands within which such calls to another and surrenders to
such other possession of the whole."
"The first presumption last above-named yields to clear,
relevant evidence showing that the possession outside the calls
of the deed was not characterized by any recognition of the true
ownership whether that occur by mistake of boundaries or distinct hostile intention. The second of such presumptions yields
to clear evidence that the premises were taken from a predecessor in possession as part of the property purchased and that the
two possessions so intentionally united were physically united by
the successor going into possession at or before the time his
predecessor went out of possession."
THE ENTRY AND INTENTION

To constitute adverse possession, entry must be made with defined claim of title and of possession continued while the statute
runs; and, after entry such claim cannot be enlarged unless by
acts equivalent to a new entry and new claim of adverse possession." Mere words, unaccompanied by acts of ownership will
12
not amount to an adverse user.
Whether an entry by one person upon the lands of another
without any agreement is an ouster of the legal possession arising
from the title or is in subordination to such title depends upon
the intention with which the entry is made and is usually a question of fact for the jury."
It is apparent, therefore, that claimant must make entrywith a
clear, distinct and unequivocal intent to claim title.
"Pepper vs. O'Dowd, 39 Wis. at page 548.
The Fox River Flour Company vs. Kelly, 70 Wis. 288.
"Richetson vs. Galligan, 89 Wis. at page 399; Jansen vs. Huerth, 143
Wis'. 363.
110
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THE ADVERSE POSSESSION MUST RUN FOR THE STATUTORY PERIOD

In order for an adverse claimant to obtain title by adverse possession the occupation of the land in question must be actually
continued for the statutory period without interruption. 4
THE MATTER

OF GOOD FAITH

Our Supreme Court in an early Wisconsin case, WVoodward
vs. McReynolds, 2 Pin 268 announced this doctrine:
"Adverse possession, in order to be effective, must consist of
an occupancy of the lands in good faith, and under the belief that
the claimant has a good title; and an adverse possession, which
is not characterized with good faith and honesty, is a mere sham,
and cannot avail as against the true owner or his grantee. The
quo animo, with which possession is commenced or continued is
the test to decide whether the possession is adverse."
The doctrine of this case was, however, overruled by the Court
at a later date in these words:
"In order to Obtain title by adverse possession, whether founded
upon claim merely, or upon color of title, and whether simply
possessio pedis, or, in addition, a constructive possession coextensive with the premises described in the written instrument
constituting the color of title,--good faith in the entry and occupancy is not essential; an entry by the disseizor hostile to all the
world, an intention to hold the land as his own, and an actual
holding of it for the statutory period being sufficient."'"
And then in these clear and unequivocal terms the doctrine
was later announced:
"Actual occupancy of land to the exclusion of the true owner,
regardless of whether in good faith or bad faith, whether by
mistake of boundaries or with intent to claim the land with full
knowledge that the claim is wrongful, satisfies the calls of the
statute. Such adverse possession of part of a tract under color
of title, with intent to claim the whole, in legal effect, extends the
boundaries of the tract, and such actual possession beyond such
boundaries, operates to the same effect upon the title of any
other claimant, except that the twenty year statute applies instead of the ten year statute.' 6
"Heininy vs. Dunn, 125 Wis. at page 279.
'Marshall T. in Lampinan vs. Alstyne, 94 Wis. 429; also so held in
McCann vs. Welsh, 1o6 Wis. 147. Also Northwestern Ry. Co. vs. Groh, 85
Wig. 645; Steinberg vs. Salzinan, 139 Wis. at p. 124.
"Marshall J. in Ovig vs. Morrison, 142 Wis. at page 247. Supported
III
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PERMISSIVE ADVERSE POSSESSION

Mere permissive possession is never a basis for the statute of
limitations.Y7 In the very recent case of Perkins vs. Perkins,
173 Wis. 421 it was held: "Continued possession of premises

after entry by permission of the true owners is not adverse to
such owners so as to defeat their title until after the possessor
has asserted a claim of title to the land in such a way as to bring
his claim to the notice of the owners.""
And in Weisner vs. Tager, 175 Wis. 281, that where an easement of way was claimed because of the mere use by pedestrians
for more than twenty years of a well-defined path across the
plaintiff's premises, the mere fact that the user continued for
that period did not raise the presumption of adverse hostile user.
A permissive user, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen
into an easement by prescription.
The evidence disclosed that for many years there existed a
pathway extending from defendant's residence and summer cottages along the lake shore across plaintiff's property to a general
store and amusement grounds, and the defendants, their families,
tenants, and guests, without the express consent of the plaintiffs
or their predecessors but with their knowledge and acquiesence,
were accustomed to use, without consenting or asserting a right
to do so, the path of pleasure or business and the court held that
the user of plaintiff's premises was permissive and not adverse.
But, "Permissive possession may ripen into an adverse possession by declaration or acts or both. 2 Corp. Jur. 124, Secs. 210,
133; Bartlett vs. Secor, 56 Wis.

520;

Meyer vs. Hope, IOI Wis.

A continuous, and exclusive possession of land for over
twenty- years raises the presumption that possession is adverse
and throws the burden of proof upon the true owner to show that
it was permissive."' 19
The doctrine of permissive possession was perhaps best stated
in Meyer vs. Hope, Supra; "Permissive possession no matter how
long continued does not make title."
123.

by: Ill. Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, io6 Wis. 499, 511; Pitnian vs. Hill, 117
Wis. 318; Clithero vs. Fenney, 122 Wis. 356; Off vs. Henricks, 124 Wis.
44o; Ill. Steel Co. vs. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418; Bishop vs. Bleyer, TO5 Wis. 330;
Wilson vs. Stork, 171 Wis. 561.
'Ryan vs. Schwatz, 94 Wis. 411; Allen vs. Ellis, 125 Wis'. at page
574; Schinoldt vs. Loper, 174 Wis. 152.
'Perkins vs. Perkins, 173 Wis. 421.
t' Vinie J. in Hahn vs. Keith, 17o Wis. at page 527.
112
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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PAY. TAXES

The fact in an action to quiet title by adverse possession that
the claimant failed to pay taxes upon*the land adversely held is
to be considered in judging the character of his possession but
it is by no means conclusive.2"
PROOF NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AN ADVERSE POSSESSION

The facts essential to adverse possession must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence, the presumptions being in favor
of the true owner till facts are so established indicating continued
disseizin of such owner for the full period necessary to divest
him of title. The foregoing rule is not satisfied by mere general
statements of witnesses not based on facts conclusively established rendering adverse possession not within reasonable prob21
abilities.
Evidence of adverse possession is always to be construed
strictly, and every presumption is to be made in favor of the true
owner. The burden of establishing it is on him who asserts it and
it is not to be made out by inference or presumption, but by clear
22
and positive proof.
What constitutes adverse possession is for the court to determine, but the facts which establish it are for the jury, and the
question of the character of the possession is generally submitted
23
to them.
While possession, occupation, and improvements for several
years, with the knowledge of the true owner, may be prima facie
evidence of adverse possession, yet they are not conclusive and
may be explained and rebutted by proof of facts showing that
24
the possession was not in fact adverse.
Evidence of adverse possession must be clear and positive, and
should be strictly construed, and every reasonable presumption
made in favor of the true owner; but whether or not -the facts
-Hamachek vs. Duvall, 135 Wis. io8.
2Illintois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, i5 Wig. 68; Jansen vs. H, erth, 143
Wis. 363.
"Snydor vs. Palmer, 29 Wis. 252; Wilson vs. Henry, 35 Wis. 245;
Hacker vs. Horlenzus, 74 Wis. 21; Dhejt vs. Beuscher, 83 Wis. 325;
Ayers vs. Reidell, 84 Wis. :283; Graeven vs. Dieves, 68 Wis. 317; Fairfield
vs. Barrette, 73 Wis. 468; Meyer vs. Hoire, ioi Wis. 129.
'Gross vs. Woodward, go N. Y. 638.
2Ayers vs. Reidell, 84 Wis. 283; Jansen vs. Huerth, 143 Wis. 363;

Worcester vs. Lord, 56 Me. 265.
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exist to make the possession adverse so as to ripen into a title
under the statutes of limitation is a question for the jury under
proper intructions, and their finding will not be disturbed when
there is evidence to support it.25
EFFECT OF CONVEYANCE BY ONE IN ADVERSE POSSESSION

The question often arises as to the effect of a conveyance of
the land by the adverse holder before the period of limitation has
run. May the successive holder, the transferee, "tack" on the
adverse possession of his predecessors and acquire title by adverse possession by holding the land adversely for the unexplained
portion of the period of limitation? In the case of Illinois Steel
Co. vs. Budzisz, io6 Wis. 499, this question was answered in the
affirmative, the court saying that under such statute the true
owner may be excluded from possession during the whole period
of limitation by possession in succession connected by privity
between the actors.
"Privity denotes merely a succession of relationships to the
same thing, whether created by deed, or by other act; or by operation of law. If one, by agreement, surrender his possession to
another and the acts of the parties are such that the two possessions actually connect, the latter commencing at or before the
former ends, leaving no interval for the constructive possession
of the true owner to intervene, such two possessions are blended
into one, and the limitation period on the right of such owner to
reclaim the land is thereby continued, because by the statute, as
construed, the only essential to such continuity is that the dispossession of the true owner be actually continued."
ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

No title can be obtained by adverse possession for twenty years
to land held by the state in any capacity.26 There can be no adverse possession of lands belonging to the government.2
ADVERSE POSSESSION MAY BE BROKEN UP

RE-ENTRY

If an owner of land be disseized thereof by another; any notorious re-entry by the former in person or by his authorized

'Lantpman vs. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 418.
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Bilot, 1O9 Wis. 418. Cf. Section 4229. Klinkert
vs. Racine, 177 Wis. 200 (municipal corporation).
'Whitney vs. Gunderson, 31 Wis. 359; Knight vs. Leary, 54 Wis. 459.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

agent for the purpose of dispossessing the disseizor, will effectively interrupt and put an end to the latter's adverse possession,
regardless of the length of time the interruption continues.
That which actually breaks the continuity of adverse possession
ends it for all purposes. The disseizin of the true owner may, by
a fresh disseizin, start a new period of adverse possession, but
cannot thereby obtain any benefit whatever from prior possession.
The essentials of an entry effective to break an adverse possession will vary according to the character of the premises
involved. A re-entry of a mere casual or secret character will
not interrupt an adverse possession. The re-entry, to have that
effect must be animo clamandi and either known to the occupant
or characterized by sets or circumstances from which knowledge
on his part would be reasonably inferred.
If an adverse occupant of land attorns to the true owner the
disseinzin of the latter is thereby interrupted.
Entry by the true owner, upon premises not physically occupied adversely so as to permit physical disturbance thereof, the
premises being marsh or overflowed land not inclosed and having
no artificial objects thereon maintained by the adverse occupant,
susceptible of physical, visible interference, and a survey of the
premises, stakes being located to indicate the boundaries thereof,
and exploring and traversing the premises from day to day for a
considerable period of time, animo clamandi, so as to reasonably
charge the adverse occupant with knowledge that his possession
is challenged and that an opportunity exists for him to vindicate
the same if he desires, is sufficient to break the continuity of the
disseizin.

28

Any interruption or discontinuance of adverse possession, before it has continued for the statutory period, restores the seizin
29
and possession to the rightful owner.
Cole C. J. in The St. Croix Land & Lumber Co.
vs. Ritchie,
78 Wis. at page 496 says: "The acts of occupancy necessary to
interrupt the running of the statute must be something more than
occasional and temporary instrusions upon the land. They should
be open and notorious, and continue unbroken for a sufficient
time to give notice to the persons interested that a claim of right
is intended by them. In Finn vs. Wisconsin Ry. Land Co., 72
"Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budsisz, II 5 Wis. 68.
"Allis vs. Field, 89 Wis. 327..
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Wis. 548, it is said by Justice Lyon that the true rule undoubtedly
is that, if the plaintiff actually and exclusively occupied the land
in hostility to the defendant's title, and subjected the same-to
their will and dominion by actual and appropriate use, according
to its locality, quality, and character, the evidence of such occupancy being tangible and visible to a person going upon and examining the lands, such occupancy and use would constitute
adverse possession. The cutting of timber occasionally on some
of the forty acre tracts or the mowing of an acre or two of
marsh lands, or the foraging of cattle upon the lands, would not
necessarily interrupt the running of the statute upon the tax
deed."
And Timlin J. in Zellmer vs. Martin, in i57 Wis. at page 344
says: "Defendant's adverse possession must be exclusive of the
true owner, not necessarily exclusive at all times of temporary
entries upon the lands by third persons not under claim of title.
Defendant's continuity of possession was not interrupted by occasional trespasses caused by the straying in upon the wood-lot
from the highway of the cattle of other persc~ns claiming no title
to the land, nor even by such occasional and unintentional tres30
passes by cattle of the plaintiff straying in from the highway."
EFFECT OF TEMPORARY ABSENCES 13Y THE ADVERSE CLAIMANT

It is an elementar' rule that where adverse possession of land
has once been fully established, occasional absences or intervals
-of there being no person residing on the premises; such-circumstances not being of a character to evidence abandonment, and
there being no actual interruption by re-entry of the person
originally dispossessed, do not change the nature of the adverse
possession.
Marshall J. made this statement in the case of Ovig vs. Morrison, 142 Wis. 243, "Absence from the premises for a short
interval may be immaterial, the true owner not asserting any
right thereto in the meantime, there being a return to the same
by the disseizor and further acts by him consistent with the first
invasion, clearly indicating a continuance thereof." 31
NOTICE-

To hold that the defendants must give notice of their adverse
holding to one of whose claims they were in utter ignorance,
Citing Illinois Steel Co. vs. Tanima, 154 Wis. 340.
'Illinois Steel Company vs. Jeka, 123 Wis'.430.

116-
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and whose rights they had never acknowledged by word or deed,
32
would be absurd.

PRIVITY OF POSSESSION A NECESSITY

The privity between successive occupants required by our
statute of limitations is privity merely of that physical possession, and is not dependent on any claim, or attempted transfer of
33
any other interest or title in the land.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES

"The statute does not purport to enumerate all the conditions
which may constitute adverse possession. It is affirmative only.
Wilson vs. Henry, 40 Wis. 594. This is true of Section 4214 as
well as Sec. 4212. A continuous disseizin of the true owner for

twenty years bars his right of action to recover real property or
the possession thereof.

3 4

PRESUMPTIONS FAVOR TRUE OWNERS

"All reasonable presumptions are to be made -in favor of the
true owners, including the presumption that actual possession is
subordinate to the right of the true owner, subject, however, to
the limitation that actual, continuous, exclusive possession for
the statutory period, unexplained displaces a presumption in
favor of the true owner and creates a presumption of fact that
such possession, and the commencement of it, were characterized
by all the requisites of title by adverse possession."3
ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER COLOR OF TITLE

The elements of actual possession necessary to draw to it constructive possession, when an adverse claim to real estate is
founded on color of title under Sec. 42ri Stats. 1898 are the same
as actual occupancy under Sec. 4213, as construed by Sec. 4214,
though the evidence deemed sufficient to establish occupancy un'Roberts vs. Decker, 120 Wis. 115.
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23; Bishop 's. Bishop, O5
Wis. 330; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, lo6 Wis. 499; Illinois Steel Co.
vs. Jeka, 119 Wis. 122; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, 11g Wis. 58o;
Clithero vs. Penner, 122 Wis. 356; Closuit vs. John Arpin L. Co., 13o Wis.
258.

" Timlin J. in Zelbner vs. Martin, 17 Wis. at page 344.
' Rosenberry J. in Perkins vs. Perkins, 173 Wis. at page 426. Citing
also Meyer vs. Hope, IoI Wis. 123; Illinois Steel Co. vs. BudzisZ, io6
Wis. 499.
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der the latter sections may not be so deemed under the former,
the circumstancs of color of title being of itself significant as to
the nature of the possession.
The only substantial difference between adverse possession under Sec. 4211 and such possession under. Sec. 4214 is that under

the former actual possession is extended by construction to the
limits of the land described in the paper conveyance or judgment
constituting the basis of color of title, while under the latter the
adverse claim is limited by the actual adverse occupancy.
When unexplained actual occupancy for the requisite length
of time has been clearly established, either undei Sec. 4211 or
Secs. 4213 or 4214 the presumption of seizin in the true owner

within such time disappears, and the presumption that the requisites of adverse possession have been complied with by the
occupant under Sec. 4210.'6
THE TEST OF WHETHER OR NOT A POSSESSION

Is

ADVERSE

The sole test of adverse holding under the statute on the subject of title by adverse possession is whether the true owner is
actually disseized for the statutory period."
In commenting on this particular point in that opinion Marshall
J. said: "It is obvious that the only sensible, safe and really
equitable rule is to make the physical characteristics of possession, excluding all other persons, the sole test of adverse possession, and so it was written into the Code."
THE PRESUMPTION OF

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Actual, continuous, exclusive possession of land by a person
and his privies in estate for twenty years, unexplained, creates a
presumption of fact that such possession and its commencement
were characterized by all the requisites of title by adverse possession, and that the title of the adverse claimant is perfect. 8
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Bilot, io9 Wis. 418; Bonne vs. Wiel, i59 Wis.
34o; Zuleger vs. Zek, i6o Wis. 6oo.
' Ovig vs. Morrison, 142 Wis. 243.
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Jeka, iig Wis. 122; Hainacheck vs. Duvall, 135
Wis. io8; Bishop vs. Bleyer, io5 Wig. 330; Off vs. Heinricks, i24 Wis.
44o; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz," io6 Wis. 49_; Carmondy vs. Mulrooney, 87 Wis. 552; Wilkins vs. Nicholai, 99 Wis. 178; Wolltnan vs.
Ruehle, 100 Wig. 31; Meyer vs. Hope, i1 Wis. 123; Wollman vs. Ruehle,
T04 Wis. 6o3; Closuit vs. John Arpin Lumber Co., i3o Wis. 258; Kloo- vs.
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WHAT MAKES A

PossEssIoN

ADVERSE

The true doctrine, recognized by all courts and text writers
was declared by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ewing's Lessee vs.
Burnett, 71 Pet. 41, 52, speaking by Mr. Justice Baldwin as follows:
"To constitute an adverse possession there need not be a fence,
building or other improvement and it suffices for the purpose
that visible and notorious acts of ownership are exercised over
the premises in controversy for the time limited by statute. So
much depends upon the nature and situation of the property, the
uses to which it can be applied or to which the owner or claimant
may choose to apply it, that it is difficult to lay down any precise
rule in all cases. But it may safely be said that where acts of
ownership have been done upon the land, which from their nature
indicate a notorious claim of property in it, and are continued
sufficiently long with the knowledge of an adverse claimant without interruption or an adverse entry by him; such acts are evidence of an ouster of a former owner and an actual adverse
possession against him, provided the jury shall think that the
property was not susceptible of a more strict or definite possession than had been so taken and held. Neither actual occupation,
cultivation nor residence are necessary where the property is so
situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement
and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by
public acts of ownership such as he would exercise over property
which he claimed in his own right and he would not exercise
over property which he did not claim."
In Illinois Steel Co. vs. Bilot, lO9 Wis. 445 the court discusses
what acts would constitute adverse possession and in that brilliant opinion the court says:
"An inclosure having no purpose of physical exclusion of outside interferences-a mere furrow turned with a plow around
the land (Sage vs. Marosick, 69 Minn. 167) or a line marked by
cutting away the brush (Worthley vs. Burbanks, 146 Ind. 534)
or a fence opened so as to admit outside disturbers (Saucrs vs.
Hood, 15o Wis. 208; Ovig vs. Morrison, 142 Wis. 243; Zideger vs. Zeh,
16o Wis. 6oo; Bader vs. Zeise, 44 Wis'. 96; Reitler vs. Lindstrom, 126 Wis.
565; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23; Progress Blue Ribbon
Farms vs. Harter,147 Wis. 136; Lampman vs. Van Alstyne, 94 Wif. 418;

Gilman vs. Brom, 1I5 Wis. i; Dreger vs. Budde, 133 Wis. 516; ZeIlmer
vs. Martin, iiS Wis. 68; Wi!son vs. Stork, I7I Wis. 561.
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Giddings, 90 Mich. 50) may be sufficient under the circumstances
to indicate, as a matter of fact, the boundaries of the adverse
claim; and- such boundaries may be evidenced satisfactorily to a
jury by any means reasonably calculated to clearly suggest the
same or suggest inquiry in regard thereto that would probably
readily and clearly lead to a discovery of the truth. It is not
necessary that such indications be sufficient to evidence constantly, by mere observation and without inquiry, the precise extent of an apparent hostile occupancy. If the claimant 'raises
his flag and keeps it up' so to speak, sufficiently to attract the
attention of -the true owner to the situation; in view of the circumstances of the invasion, as a hostile claim of title, knowledge
of such owner may be presumed as a fact, on the general principle that what a person ought to know under the circumstances
may be held to be within his knowledge regardless of the actual
fact."
In a discussion of the same subject in Cobb vs. Davenport,
32 N. J.Law 369, it was in effect said that the title to premises
may be obtained by continuous, exclusive, notorious, hostile appropriation thereof f6r the mere .purpose of hunting, hawking or
fishing."
No particular kind of inclosure, nor any inclosure, is required
t9 establish adverse possession as a matter of fact under Sec.
4214; but if such an inclosure is relied upon to establish such
possession as a matter of law, it must be of a substantial character,
though not necessarily artificial, so as to be effective as a protection against outside interference in adapting the premises to
some suitable use. If a usual improvement is relied upon to
establish adverse possession, an inclosure of any character, partly
or wholly marking the boundary claimed, or any other method of
clearly defining such boundary, accompanied with circuristances
satisfactory to a jury to establish the essential facts, is sufficient.
A usual improvement, within the meaning of Sec. 4214, does
not require improvement of the land in value but any actual use
thereof to which it is adopted and to which the owner or one
claiming to be the owner might reasonably devote it. Occupation of a locality for a burial lot, or some other purpose, that
would partially or wholly destroy its value, may be effective as an
improvement as any other, according.to the circumstances. There
must be a usual improvement; where that is relied upon, is a
matter of law; what is such an improvement is a matter of fact.
120
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Continued, exclusive, notorious use of premises covered by
water for the purpose of hunting and fishing, with other circumstances, may establish adverse possession so as to carry a case
to the jury; under proper instructions, to say whether there was
such an occupancy as to constitute disseizin of the true owner.
Actual occupancy of premises so as to indicate at every instant
of time, by mere obseryation, the extent of the hostile use, is not
necessary to satisfy Sec. 4214. It need be only such continuous,
exclusive, hostile use as in the judgment of the jury under all the
circumstances, is sufficient to notify the true owner, actually or
constructiyely of his rights and the actual extent thereof.3 9
Marshall J. in Illinois Steel Co. vs. Jeka, 123 Wis. at page 427
says: "What acts are necessary to notify the true owner of land
of a hostile invasion thereof; and what are necessary to indicate
the territorial limits of such invasion thereof; and what are
necessary, if disseizin shall have once been effected, to efficiently
indicate continuance thereof necessarily varies with the site of
the premises claimed, the location thereof, the character of the
same and a great variety of circumstances. Hence, generally,
whether the essentials of adverse possession are satisfied or not
by a given state of circumstances must be determined by the verdict of a jury under proper instructions."
And then the court quotes from the leading case in the state
of California, Brunmagim vs. Brandshaw, 39 Cal. 24-45. "The
general principle which underlies this class of cases is, that the
acts of dominion must be adapted to the particular land, its
condition, locality and appropriate use. The philosophy of the
rule is, that by such acts the party proclaims to the public that
he asserts an exclusive ownership over the land, and the acts
which he performs are in harmony with his claim of title. Hence,
they must be such as to give notice to the public; or in the language of Justice Baldwin, in Wolf vs. Baldwin, 19 Cal. 313 it

must be an open, unequivocal, actual possession-notorious, apparent, uninterrupted and exclusive, carrying with it the marks
and evidence of ownership."
The Court also said in that case: "The elucidation and application of the principle thus stated in Illinois Steel Co.. vs. Bilot,
109 Wis. 418, leaves no very good reason for going astray under

the delusion that adverse possession without an inclosure must
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418.
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necessarily be characterized by a physical, constant, visible
occupancy by improvement of every part of the premises-that
the hostile invader must actually lay his hands, so to speak, upon
the entire territory and keep them there as plainly indicating the
extent and character of the occupancy as if such premises were
covered by a mantle."
In Booth vs. Small, 25 Iowa 177 the Court said: "Possession
of land is the holding of an exclusive exercise of dominion over
it. It is evident that this is not and cannot be uniform in every
case, and that there may be degrees in the exclusiveness even of
the exercise of ownership. The owner cannot occupy, literally,
the whole tract, he cannot have an actual pedis possessio of all,
nor hold it in the grasp of his hand. His possession must be
indicated by other acts. The usual one is that of inclosure. But
this cannot always be done, yet he may hold possession, in fact,
of uninclosed land by the exercise of such acts of ownership
over it as are necessary to enjoy the ordinary use of which it is
capable and acquire the profits it yields in its present condition.
Such acts being continued and uninterrupted will amount to
actual possession."
Marshall J. in the case of Illinois Steel Co. vs. Jeka, in 123
Wis. at page 427, says: "The adverse claimant having 'raised his
flag' so to speak, on the premises by commencing the preparation
thereof for a residence lot, absence therefrom thereafter for any
period of time, short of such as to indicate abandonment of such
purpose, would not, as a matter of law break the disseizin. The
standard of the invader being once efficiently planted by some
physical change in the surface of the land, sufficient to disseize
the true owner, it might under such circumstances be relied on to
preserve such condition for a reasonable length of time."
The mere presence of surveyors locating points upon an island
in a city, some of them upon the premises in suit, which consisted of a lot fenced and occupied as a residence and garden,
and the failure of the occupant to protest against the entry upon
his premises, do not conclusively show a disseizin of the occupant, breaking the continuity of his adverse possession, especially
where the acts of the surveyors are not clearly shown to have
40
come to his knowledge.
What constitutes adverse possession is a question of law for
"Illinois Steel Company vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 34.
T22
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the court, and whether the necessary facts exist to establish it is a
question of fact for the jury. In order to constitute adverse possession against the title of the true owner, the adverse claim
must be sufficiently open and obvious, both as to the fact of
possession and its really adverse character, to apprise the true
owner, if in charge of the property and in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the fact and of an intention to usurp possession
of that which in law is his own. Secret or disconnected acts of
an equivocal character, occurring at long intervals, will not
suffice. The possession must be actual, open, continuous and
under claim of right as against the true owned."
GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

Adverse possession, then, as the term itself implies, is necessarily a possession not held under the legal proprietor, or by his
consent, either directly or indirectly; but, on the contrary, it is a
possession by which he is ousted from the land. Thus it has
been stated that in order to determine whether a possession is
adverse, it is only necessary to ascertain whether it can be considered as the constructive possession of the legal proprietor;
if so, it is not adverse, if not, then it is adverse. I R. C. L. 686.
All the authorities agree that, in order to bar the true owner
of land from recovering it from an occupant in adverse possession
and claiming under ownership through the operation of the
statute of limitations, the possession must have been, for the
whole period prescribed by the statute, actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and hostile to the true owner's title and to
the world at large. It is also essential that the possession must
have been under claim of right of color of title. I R. C. L. 616.
The test of adverse possession in Wisconsin is occupancy. In
Wisconsin "actual, continuous, exclusive possession for the
statutory period, unexplained, displaces the presumption in favor
of the true owner, and creates a presumption of fact that such
possession, and the commencement of it, were characterized by
all the requisites of adverse possession, and that the title of the
adverse claimant is perfect. The statute so provides.42
Kurz vs. Miller, 89 Wis.
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327;

Hentiis vs. Consol. W. P. & P. Co,

Wis. 518; Jansen vs. Huerth. 143 Wis. 363.

'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, io6 Wis. 499; Illinois Steel Co. vs.
Bndzisz, 126 Wis. 61o.
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In Wisconsin the hostile intent of the adverse claimant is not
necessary in order to establish title by adverse possession.
Good faith by the adverse claimant as to his right at the instant
of entry, or during the limitation period, is not necessary. The
essentials of adverse possession under the statutes are the same
where the holding is under color of title as where the holding is
not under color of title. The adverse holding must not be secret
43
but must be open and notorious.
In Wisconsin there are two periods of limitation. Under Secs.
(4211, 4212, 4215) the adverse holder claims under color of title
and the period of limitation under such circumstances is ten
years. (Adverse possession under color of title simply means
by virtue of some written instrument, purporting to be a conveyance of the land or a decree or judgment of a competent court.)
Under Sec. 4211, the period of limitation is twenty years when
claim of title is not founded upon any written instrument, judgment or decree of any competent court.
It is well established that there must be actual possession in
order to constitute adverse possession. What is actual possession? Actual occupancy is clearly actual possession within the
meaning of the statutes. But our legislature has gone farther
and has provided (in Secs, 4212 and 4214) that cultivation, improvement or inclosure always constitutes adverse possession,
and, if the occupant holds under color of title, a use for supply
of fuel, or a partial improvement according to the custom of the
surrounding country shall constitute adverse possession. There
are specific conditions which the legislature of our state has declared shall constitute adverse possession, but it must be remembered that these are not all inclusive and that they do not enumerate all of the conditions which constitute adverse possession in
this state.
The adverse holder must not recognize the rights of the true
owner of the land; otherwise his possession is not exclusive. He
must treat the premises as his property in a manner that the
owner naturally would. If he recognizes the rights of the true
owner to the property he cannot be an adverse holder. He must
exercise dominion over the land. An adverse possession may be
broken up by the re-entry of the true owner upon the premises
adversely claimed and his assertion of title thereto.
'Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budzisz, II5 Wis. 68.

